Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mereology', 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter' and 'Non-foundationalist epistemology'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell]
Matter is a logical construction [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]